Zinken and Kaiser (2022)

Zinken, J., & Kaiser, J. (2022). Formulating other minds in social interaction: Accountability and courses of action. Language in Society, 51(2), 185-210. doi:10.1017/ S0047404520000688

Here is an example of research on a very particular interactional phenomenon, which is of interest to psychologists, and all of us using talk as a primary professional tool. Zinken & Kaiser look a evidence available in everyday conversations recorded between German language speakers for how speakers reveal what they think the other person thinks: “This article is concerned with moments in social interaction in which a person formulates what another ‘thinks’ or ‘believes’.”(p.185)

Introducing research in philosophy and psychology, the authors explain the fundamental problem of not being able to directly observe what is in the mind of others: “other minds are only ever accessible to us by inference and conjecture.” (p.187). Note that Schutz (1932) explained that we interpret actions without need for inference, and instead interpretation is called on when considering why the other person has acted in a particular way. In reviewing the extant literature, the authors explain that accountability in conversation can mean: (1) making sense of another person’s actions or (2) the broader sense of moral responsibility. It is this second sense, the “normative implications of practices” – i.e. based on what people usually do – that this paper explores.

The data of 45 cases of belief formulations found in 200 hours of German regular conversations show that the phrase “you think/mean/believe (meinen) that” makes relevant an account of some sort from the other speaker. The phrase makes explicit the attribution or inferences made, calling for some further clarification, elaboration or justification. This particular use of “you think that” marks the prior talk as unexpected in some way, and not yet established as fact.

If the recipient really doubts the veracity of the prior claim, framing as a question using interrogative syntax (Do you think that..?) always conveys (in this data) an incredulous stance. The authors explain that beliefs are not privately held, veiled matters, but rather occasioned by others, as being evident and attributable in what speakers do or say. This brings the subjective to the surface, requiring a justification of the attributed belief. In other words, “by formulating another’s belief, I am not formulating a particular kind of mental state the other has, but I am making their subjectivity relevant in a particular way: I am calling on them to commit to, to endorse or account for the intentionality and rationality of what they have just done.”(p. 208)